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On thè Idea of Reflexive Rhetoric in Homer 
Mari Lee Mifsud 
For Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. 
When Ody sseus, disguised as a beggar, sees his handmaidens flirting with 
the suitors, he délibérâtes about how to punish their unfaithfulness {Od. 
20.9-21). He is tempted to spring on them and kill each one. But he 
reasons that since the combination of endurance and cunning intelligence 
allowed him to escape the cave of the Cyclops, at a time when he suffered 
worse, it is likely to work in his présent situation. He chooses to endure. 
When Henry Johnstone and I translated this passage, we wondered to 
what extent we could say that Odysseus persuades himself to endure. Is 
Odysseus involved in self-persuasion, what Johnstone has termed reflex- 
ive rhetoric, when he délibérâtes? Answering this question led us to ex- 
plore related questions such as, does Odysseus hâve a "self to which his 
délibération/persuasion can be addressed? If so, how do we know that 
Odysseus actually persuades himself when he délibérâtes? If Odysseus 
does persuade himself, can we say he practices rhetoric on himself? Can 
we even talk of rhetoric in Homer? Through this essay, I wish to share - 
at least in part - our exploration of thèse questions. In particular, I ad- 
dress how Johnstone's idea of the rhetorical wedge moves us toward the 
idea of a reflexive rhetoric in Homer, a rhetoric in which Odysseus seems 
to be involved in his various délibérations. 
I focus on Odysseus's délibération in the Odyssey, since his is the 
Homeric archetype, and since the Odyssey is the text that Johnstone and I 
have been enamored with since late fall of 1993.1 Four scènes in particu- 
lar are explicit, complete portrayals of Odyssean délibération: (1) 
Odysseus délibérâtes about whether to obey the goddess Leukothea's in- 
structions (5.355-64); (2) He délibérâtes about how best to approach 
Nausikaa (6. 141-48); (3) He délibérâtes about how to approach his fight 
with Iros (18.90-94); And (4) he délibérâtes about how to punish his 
handmaidens (20.9-11). In all four of thèse scènes, the process of 
Odysseus's délibération is the same. He becomes aware of a problem - 
obeying Leukothea, approaching Nausikaa, fighting Iros, and punishing 
his handmaidens - and then he générâtes alternative approaches to these 
Problems. Should he take Leukothea's magie veil or stay on his raft as 
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long as possible and find his own way to shore? Should he, naked and 
filthy from the sea, clasp Nausikaa's knees or beseech her from behind 
the brush? Should he fìght to kill Iros or only to wound him? Should he 
kill the handmaidens in the heat of the moment or endure their behavior? 
Finally, he announces a reason for his choice. He will remain on his raft 
because Leukothea may be trying to trick him and because land is too far 
away to abandon it yet. He will persuade Nausikaa from behind the brush 
so that he won't anger her. He will only wound Iros so that he will not 
raise suspicions about his own identity. He will endure the behavior of 
his handmaidens to wait for a more opportune moment and a more strate- 
gie plan. 
In light of thèse four explicit and complete scènes of délibération, the 
question arises, does Odysseus's délibération proceed as an internai 
suasory discourse? When he recognizes a problem before him, poses 
alternative future actions to himself as potential responses, and makes a 
choice among them based on a certain reason, has Odysseus persuaded 
himself? 
Problems arise with an affirmative response. Most obvious is the sug- 
gestion that Odysseus has a "self that can be persuaded. This suggestion 
raises questions among critics such as Bruno Snell who deny the exist- 
ence of self-awareness in Homeric characters. Snell argues that no single, 
identifiable word for "self exists in the Homeric epics (1953, 8). Words 
that might look like équivalents for "self," such as , , , and 
, are not. Instead, they denote only the inner parts of the Homeric 
person, which are analogous to organs with no unifying principle to ren- 
der them cohérent (8-9).2 The problem posed by Snell is this: The 
Homeric person does not deliberate, and therefore could not be involved 
in a process of self-persuasion, because the Homeric person has no con- 
sciousness of a single self to which délibération/persuasion could be ad- 
dressed. Snell's problem arises from lexical grounds: the absence of a 
single word for the self that would mark the Homeric idea of the self. 
One way to respond to the Snellian hypothesis might be to posit lexi- 
cal évidence of self-awareness (Sullivan 1988, Claus 1981, Jahn 1987). 
Homeric Greek has a first-person form of active and middle/passive verbs, 
and it has reflexive pronouns. Both of these features show that a person 
distinguished his/her expériences from those of another. Homeric indi- 
viduals used personal pronouns as well. This reflects a notion of personal 
identity, an awareness of one's separateness from others. But, as Johnstone 
has written, / denotes a person, not a self (1970, 110). Perhaps we can 
posit more complex or significant lexical évidence. For example, the 
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oblique cases of  suggest the person as agent. Many of the Homeric 
words in the "soul/self ' semantic range seem to be interchangeable, used 
pleonastically for poetic purposes, hence revealing an implicit unity (Jahn 
1987). Furthermore, the Homeric Greek case System includes thè accu- 
sative of respect, which indicates that a person is aware of being affected 
as a whole as well as within a particular part (Sullivan 1988, 6). 
Positing even this kind of lexical évidence fails to résolve the Snellian 
problem, though it certainly seems to corne close to doing so. Ultimately, 
it fails because it fails to question the assumption that a culture must have 
a word for a thing in order to recognize that thing's existence. It seems 
entirely possible that a culture could operate consciously prior to its in- 
vention of a System of names for the various opérations in which they are 
involved (Gaskin 1990, Knox 1993, Sharples 1983). To argue otherwise 
would lead to the conclusion that those cultures guided by a System of 
abstract language are the only cultures to operate in conscious ways. This 
argument présupposes that only one form of consciousness counts - the 
consciousness that anses from an abstract vocabulary. The implications 
alone of this argument seem to provide grounds enough upon which to 
reject it. Moreover, as Johnstone once remarked to me, are we to believe, 
according to the Snellian approach to human consciousness, that people 
didn't have egos prior to Freud calling them egos? Or that the Esquimaux 
do not know snow because they have no one word for it? 
Johnstone's questions highlight for us the snare of the lexical method, 
namely, that consciousness of a particular phenomenon can exist prior to 
its being named. While the abstraction of a name may allow us to think 
differently about a given phenomenon, it does not necessarily mark the 
origin of consciousness about that phenomenon. Naming présupposes a 
level of awareness; it does not create awareness from scratch. It seems 
quite possible that Homer could communicate a unity in multiplicity in a 
way that the intellectual culture in which Snell opérâtes could not. While 
Snell might be able to say that he would be fragmented and schizoid if he 
didn't operate within a language System that could provide him with the 
word self, this does not mean that people in the Homeric poems were por- 
trayed as fragmented and schizoid because Homer didn't have a word for the 
se//(Padel 1992, 44-48). This is not to say that consciousness (Homeric or 
otherwise) exists prior to language, but only to say that consciousness is not 
exclusively dépendent on an abstract language like the abstraction of a single, 
identifiable name for a particular concept or phenomenon. 
Odysseus's self may not be manifest lexically, but it doesn't have to 
be. It is manifest operationally - through the very process of his délib- 
ération. Atthisjuncture, Johnstone's worktakes hold. As Johnstone has 
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theorized, thè self émerges from a problem giving rise to délibération 
(1970). 
Odysseus délibérâtes because a situation has arisen in which his mind 
is torn in two. In the Homeric formula " 
 
(torn asunder, he 
délibérâtes),"3 the Controlling word is , "asunder," not , 
"deliberate," since it is the former that makes the latter possible (13 Sep- 
tember 1994).4 Odysseus's mind is sundered when Leukothea tempts 
him with the magie veil, when he must approach Nausikaa, when he must 
fìght Iros, and when he sees his handmaidens. When Odysseus begins to 
deliberate, he reveals his own récognition of this sundering as problem- 
atic. He could not recognize this sundering from a fragmented perspec- 
tive, but only from the unity of the seif. Johnstone explains that, from the 
sundered mind, the self émerges as the point of view including both (or 
ali) poles of the sundering (15 September 1994). Hence, the self "sees" - 
or, in other words, the person's attention is called to - the sundering. This 
sight poses a contradiction for the person, what Carroll Arnold has called 
the "paradoxical pair of awarenesses" (Arnold 1987, 121). The paradox 
becomes a bürden for the person who realizes that s/he cannot be both 
poles. Délibération occurs precisely to respect the sundering, and it serves 
to unburden the self from the tension of contradiction. The incentive to 
deliberate arises when one realizes that one must choose. 
In this way we can see how Odysseus's sundering and resulting délib- 
ération make manifest his self. Délibération présupposes self-conscious- 
ness of the necessity to make a choice. In this perspective, we can also 
see the emerging relationship between délibération and persuasion.5 
In Johnstone's view, if to be persuaded means to be made conscious of 
an object or thesis, then we can cali the coming of consciousness of the 
necessity to deliberate self-persuasion (14 September 1994). Hence, dé- 
libération results from self-persuasion. But can we really say that per- 
suasion has occurred prior to the application of a deliberative calculus? 
One might argue that it is a deliberative calculus that allows Odysseus to 
generate alternative courses of action and to choose among them for the 
most fìtting response to his problem. When Odysseus décides that he 
will only wound Iros to prevent raising suspicions about his own identity, 
he générâtes in himself a reason to believe - a logos, if you will - why 
this is better than killing him. He délibérâtes about his future action and 
arrives at a choice reasoned through a calculus. This logos might be said 
to persuade him into making the choice he makes. Therein, one might 
say, Odysseus persuades himself through the use of a deliberative calcu- 
lus, and in this way délibération and persuasion are related. 
This content downloaded from 141.166.177.91 on Wed, 2 Apr 2014 15:40:39 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REFLEXIVE RHETORIC IN HOMER 45 
If this is the essential link between délibération and persuasion, namely, 
thè use of a deliberative calculus, then can we say Odysseus persuaded 
himself even in the absence of such a calculus? The majority of Homeric 
délibération scènes contain no deliberative calculi.6 For example, when 
Odysseus lands on thè shore of Scheda, he gives no reason why he chooses 
to sleep in the woods rather than on the beach (5.465-87). The lack of a 
deliberative calculus might make Odysseus's action seem arbitrary rather 
than deliberate. 
One approach to this problem would be to generalize from the scènes 
where Odysseus uses deliberative calculi to those where he does not. We 
could say that in thèse latter scènes the calculi are implicit. This seems 
reasonable, since we know Homer is a poet of action, not of thought. For 
poetic purposes, Homer does not always elaborate thought, though he 
does provide enough évidence of it to warrant a generai description of 
Odysseus as deliberate, even in the absence of a calculus. 
Even if we can affirm that deliberative calculi can be implicit, still we 
hâve not established whether thè use of a deliberative calculus is the essen- 
tial bridge between délibération and persuasion. To re-address the issue, 
Johnstone asks, if we believe délibération and persuasion to be linked pri- 
marily by thè use of deliberative calculi, then are we committed to believe, 
for example, that Big Blue persuaded itself when it made moves against 
Gary Kasparov (20 May 1997 and 28 May 1997)? Johnstone explains that 
Big Blue's program is said to be heuristic, "At any given point in a game, it 
surveys the possibilities and chooses the one that seems best. This is in 
effect no more than what a human player can do" (28 May 1997). 
The question of whether Big Blue persuades itself can be generalized 
to the question of whether nonhumans communicate. This is one of the 
questions exercising George Kennedy in "A Hoot in the Dark" (1992). 
Kennedy argues that the communication présent in nature shows signs of 
rhetorical energy. Johnstone, like Kennedy, notes, "There is clearly a 
sensé in which bées use language. Their dances communicate the where- 
abouts of nectar. The sensé of 'communicate' hère is the same as that in 
which machines 'communicate' with one another. A radar beacon can 
communicate to the computer of an airplane the whereabouts of an air- 
port" (1988, 128). 
Johnstone, though, stops short of identifying the nonhuman and hu- 
man sensés of communicate in the way that Kennedy does. He contends 
that when one collapses the distinction between thèse two sensés of com- 
municate, one fails to question the assumption that communication is pri- 
marily a kind of compétence. If we understand communication primarily 
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as a compétence, then we must believe that animal communication and 
machine communication are fundamentally similar to human communi- 
cation. And we must capitulate to thè idea that machines could be more 
perfect communicators than humans (1988, 128). For Johnstone, though, 
human communication is unique and exists on a level différent from that 
of bées or chess-playing machines. For Johnstone, communication is a 
consciousness, not a compétence. 
Big Blue is not conscious. Because of thè continuity between its input 
and its output, Big Blue can ne ver stand apart from its data. It can ne ver 
take account of thèse data as objects. One might argue, though, that data 
hâve to be transmitted to and outputted from a computer via interfaces, 
one where data are transformed into electrical impulses, and one where 
thè output is printed as information. But Johnstone rejects thèse "inter- 
faces" as real interfaces because no gap exists between the data fed to the 
machine as input and the machine itself, and again between the machine 
and the information available as output on the printed page (1996a, 3-5). 
The input and output are two forms of energy belonging to the same sys- 
tem. A computer cannot take on a perspective other than its input and its 
output. That the computer translates input into output is an inévitable 
resuit of its having been inputted, the inevitability coming into question 
only on the occasion of a mechanical breakdown. 
Délibération means thè act of being deliberate, and to be deliberate is 
to be conscious of the freedom to make choices. This freedom is unavail- 
able to Big Blue. Big Blue does not freely enter thè game. And because 
Big Blue is ne ver free to stand against its input or its output, it ne ver faces 
any temptation in the course of its calculations. Whereas we can con- 
ceive of Kasparov going through a rigorous calculation, surveying the 
choices and selecting one that seems best for any possible move, we can 
also conceive of him being tempted to act in a way inconsistent with the 
results of his calculation. Or he might be tempted to quit thè game. The 
coming of either temptation would cali for him either to resist it or to 
yield to it, both of which would require délibération. Big Blue can never 
face such a temptation or involve itself in the délibération required for 
one to resist or yield to a particular temptation. It cannot stand against its 
data. It is not free. It has no incentive. 
Unlike Big Blue, Odysseus is free and motivated. And he does face 
temptation. He is tempted toacceptLeukothea's magie veil. He is tempted 
to clasp Nausikaa's knees. He is tempted to kill Iros and his handmaidens. 
Odysseus expériences temptation because he is aware of the possibility 
of doing something other than what cornes automatically or impulsively. 
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Odysseus has perspective on his expérience. Only with perspective can 
one say "I am tempted to do that" without simply doing what comes natu- 
rally, in other words, without always acting as a slave to impulse. The 
incentive to deliberate does not arise in a person (or machine) who fails 
to recognize him/herself as fundamentally free. This récognition forces 
an interruption of thè unity of the transaction between subject and object 
(Johnstone 1978, 131). Such an interruption allows Odysseus to stand 
apart from his expérience to observe it. 
The deliberative calculus cannot be thè essential link between délib- 
ération and persuasion, though it undoubtedly figures into the process of 
self-persuasion to the extent that it either explicitly or implicitly brings 
about a particular décision. This moment of particular décision is cer- 
tainly a moment of self-persuasion. But it seems that in Johnstone's per- 
spective, when one suddenly sees that one must choose, in other words, 
when one arrives at thè generai décision to decide, self-persuasion has 
already occurred; it does not lie in the calculus that yields the décision. 
Johnstone writes, "The calculus that ensues after the soul is 'split asun- 
der' is not itself an act of persuasion, and is persuasive only in the way in 
which thè results of any calculation are persuasive. But the use of this 
calculus présupposes the self-persuasion entailed in the acknowledgment 
that there is a problem requiring délibération" (14 September 1994). The 
essential moment that makes délibération self-persuasion is prior to the 
use of a deliberative calculus - it is the very moment of consciousness of 
thè necessity to deliberate. 
In this perspective, the fact that Homer is frequently silent about de- 
liberative calculi is irrelevant to the question of whether Odysseus per- 
suades himself . Johnstone writes, "Just as the prime tactic of persuasion 
is to let the audience draw its own conclusions - is, therefore, 
enthymematic - so the self-persuasion that makes one see that there is a 
problem puts one in the position to reach one's own conclusions about 
coping with the problem" (14 September 1994). 
Since délibération signais that an agent is conscious of a problem at 
hand, and is aware of the necessity to résolve this problem through (in- 
ner) speech, délibération, like persuasion, présupposes a Bitzerian "rhe- 
torical situation." But délibération, like persuasion, présupposes some- 
thing even more fundamental than the rhetorical situation - the rhetorical 
wedge. It is this wedge that evokes one's consciousness both of a prob- 
lem and of the potential to résolve the problem through speech, whether 
in public assembly or through inner debate. For Johnstone, it is the very 
function of rhetoric to cali attention to a situation for which objectivity is 
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claimed: "If rhetoric is an art of persuasion, it practices this art by solic- 
iting attention. ... A stimulus that directly excites a reflex, never emerg- 
ing as an object of consciousness, is irrelevant to rhetorical transactions" 
(1990, 334).7 
In the absence of the rhetorical wedge, no medium can be opened be- 
tween consciousness and its object, whether this consciousness is mani- 
fest publicly in open forum or personally in inner debates. Johnstone 
notes Aristotle's message to Democritus, that in the absence of a medium 
we could see nothing at all (1996a, 2). Sight présupposes , or an 
"in-between," what Johnstone has sometimes called an interface (1996a, 
2; 1982, 95-102; 1970, 122-31). We could not, for example, see an ob- 
ject placed directly on the eye. Johnstone writes, "Language, thè me- 
dium of communication, likewise must separate the message from its ré- 
cipient. Otherwise it would be as if we had opened a person's skull and 
simply placed the information on his/her brain, as one might place an 
object on someone's eye" (1996a, 2). Bee communication and computer 
communication work this way. But in human communication, informa- 
tion does not pass directly from its source to thè Storage facilities of the 
receiver (1996a, 5-6). And in human délibération, the unity between 
impulse and action is interrupted. 
The visionary nature of Johnstone's rhetorical wedge allows us to see 
that it opérâtes both from the outside and from within. To the extent that 
rhetoric, as Johnstone conceives it, functions to evoke consciousness - to 
attack unawareness - we can say that rhetoric evokes consciousness not 
only in other people, but also in oneself. Johnstone writes, "Public per- 
suasion attempts to drive this wedge between the audience and some fact 
or thesis of which it has hitherto been unconscious; délibération (= self- 
persuasion) drives it between a subject no longer unconscious of the choice 
s/he must make and him/herself; it brings the choice to consciousness" 
(13 September 1994). 
In his extension of rhetoric to a private sphère, Johnstone accounts for 
its reflexivity, a phenomenon that he himself admits has not generally 
been recognized (1970, 125). He contends that what invites thè interpre- 
tative act need not be external to the interpréter. "When rhetoric is ca- 
pable of flowing in two directions, it can flow both from me and to me. I 
can, in other words, be my own audience. I can drive the wedge between 
stimulus and sensation that is required to evoke my own consciousness" 
(1990, 337). 
When Odysseus asks himself whether he should kill his handmaidens 
or endure their behavior, he thwarts the stimulus-response behavior that 
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primarily characterizes nonrhetorical communication. He drives a wedge 
between stimulus and sensation, a wedge that makes apparent his own 
consciousness of the freedom to make a choice about how he wants to 
respond to the stimulus. He makes a generai décision to decide. And 
when he arrives at a particular décision regarding his future action, he 
again has moved himself through speech. 
So, in this way, we can say Odysseus is engaged in a reflexive rhetoric 
when he délibérâtes. But can we speak of rhetoric in Homer, let alone of 
a kind other than suasory discourse in the public sphère? Is persuasion in 
Homer an art that we can cali rhetoric? Furthermore, is self-persuasion 
portrayed as an art by Homer? Again, Johnstone's work moves us toward 
thè idea of a reflexive rhetoric in Homer (1996b). 
The idea of Homeric rhetoric is alleged to pose the problem of anach- 
ronism.8 These allégations hold that because no word rhetorikê exists in 
the poems, and because certain linguistic advances had not yet been made, 
like the invention of a philosophical vocabulary, rhetoric does not exist in 
the poems. Persuasion, then, appears to be only a knack, a random or 
arbitrary act, or a gift of thè gods, rather than a systematic art. 
One way to respond to thèse allégations is to show that the existence 
of the term rhetorikê, like the existence of a philosophical vocabulary, is 
irrelevant to the question of whether an art of persuasion existed in Homer. 
The same argument raised against the Snellian hypothesis is raised again. 
Johnstone writes, "My own view is that whether rhetorikê or (following a 
point made by Poulakos) oblique cases of this word (not just the nomina- 
tive, but thè genitive, dative, or accusative) occur before Piato is irrel- 
evant to the question whether rhetoric as a discipline occurred before 
Piato. It is not altogether absurd to suppose that rhetoric was a recog- 
nized verbal art even in the time of Homer, even though no case of the 
noun rhetorikê occurs in Homer" (1996b, 438). 
For Johnstone, answering whether rhetoric exists in Homer dépends 
on how we define it (1996b, 439). We might want to defìne rhetoric in a 
way that separates it from the practice of persuasion. Rhetoric then be- 
comes armchair persuasion and opérâtes as the analy sis or theorization of 
persuasion and not the act itself. But we don't have to define it this way.9 
In fact, we usually don't. Johnstone notes that when we talk about Newt 
Gingrich's rhetoric, we are not making références to his rhetorical theory. 
As Johnstone suggests, if we define rhetoric as the art of persuasion, where 
theory and practice are inextricably linked, then, to answer the question 
of whether rhetoric exists in Homer, we would need to explore only 
whether anything in the poems suggests that persuasion is in fact an art. 
This content downloaded from 141.166.177.91 on Wed, 2 Apr 2014 15:40:39 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
50 MARI LEE MIFSUD 
 say that rhetoric is an art of persuasion is to say that persuasive 
practice has been acquired by some kind of method, as opposed to its 
being a mere knack. But it does not follow from this that the method 
discovered/applied has to be Aristotelian. It is very likely that people in 
the Dark Ages had their own understanding of a method for acquiring and 
practicing persuasion. Kennedy suggests that a Homeric awareness of 
rhetoric was nurtured by the method of listening to older speakers and 
acquiring formulae, thèmes, maxims, and stock topics such as myths and 
historical examples (1963, 36; see also Donlan, 5 November 1988, 1-4). 
Regardless of how Homeric people were habituated in persuasion, we 
know that they were. Homer tells us so in the often-cited passage at Iliad 
9.443. Phoenix describes his responsibilities as tutor to Achilles: to teach 
() Achilles to be a speaker () of speeches and a doer of 
deeds. Speaking effectively in the assembly and fighting bravely in war 
seem to be regarded as equally teachable. In addition to this, at Odys- 
sey 1.384- 85, after Telemachus has spoken boldly to the suitors, Antinous 
responds that thè gods must hâve taught () him how to speak 
effectively. That the gods are involved in Telemachus's éducation in speech 
does not undermine the claim that speech was considered to be taught, 
but rather emphasizes the point that it must be if even thè gods must use 
instructional means - as opposed to magie - to help humans become good 
speakers. These seem to be the only explicit pièces of évidence that speech 
was taught, and Homer never expands on how speech was taught. How- 
ever, he probably didn't need to say anything more on the subject. His 
silence may indicate that his audience already knew that the skills in- 
volved in hunting, fighting, speechmaking, and the like, were taught.10 
To say any more would be unnecessary. 
As additional évidence of an art of persuasion in Homer, the numerous 
persuasive practices in the epics show a consciousness of the necessity of 
persuasion, of inventing potentially persuasive sayables, and of critiqu- 
ing the appropriateness of persuasive messages based on an awareness of 
effective and ineffective speech: thè deliberative debates throughout the 
Iliad and in book 2 of the Odyssey, Antenor's comparison of the speak- 
ing styles of Odysseus and Menelaus in Ilia d 3 (Naas 1995, 134),Priam's 
persuasion of Achilles in Iliad 24 (Naas 1995, 134),11 Helen's debate over 
what to say to Telemachus and how to say it when she recognizes him as 
Odysseus's son in Odyssey 4, and Menelaus's critique of Peisistratus's 
speech in Odyssey 15. These scènes reveal a criticai awareness of lan- 
guage and its strategie uses and effects. They reveal not only speech- 
making, but also criticism of speeches and inventional processes. Homeric 
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speeches even share formal structures, suggesting that they hâve a method 
(Toohey 1994). 
It seems likely that Homeric persuasion was an art, prior to the coining 
of the term rhetorikê or the invention of a philosophical vocabulary.12 As 
Johnstone writes, "To speak of rhetoric in Homer is no anachronism; it is 
simply a way of saying what we want to say about Homer. He perhaps 
didn't have the term, but we do. Having it, we can use it wherever it 
applies" (January 1996). And it applies not only to public persuasive prac- 
tices in Homer, but to private practices as well. 
In Homer, self-persuasion, like public persuasion, appears to be an art, 
a habituated practice. That the four explicit and complete Odyssean dé- 
libération scènes proceed in the same way - namely, through recognizing 
a problem, realizing alternative courses of action, and making a choice 
based on a reason(s) - suggests an existing method of deliberating. But 
more fundamental than this, we know that Odysseus is acquainted with an 
art of self-persuasion because of his ability to resist temptation: "To resist 
temptation requires a self-directed rhetoric, which is clearly an art since it 
does not come naturally" (Johnstone, 14 March 1996). Furthermore, that 
délibération does not come naturally is most evident in the example of 
Telemachus. His nondeliberate character in the early stages of the poem 
begins to transform when he gains exposure to deliberative modeis.13 While 
Homer portrays Telemachus as Coming to consciousness about the neces- 
sity to deliberate and acquiring thè necessary skills to deliberate, Homer 
portrays Odysseus as a master deliberator, one who has not only recog- 
nized thè necessity to deliberate, but has mastered the method. 
These are some of the ideas on a reflexive rhetoric in Homer that Henry 
Johnstone and I have explored. Our exploration continues though, not only 
to sharpen our understanding of the presuppositions of délibération, but to 
see how and to what effect, by examining thè idea of a reflexive rhetoric in 
Homer, we diversify the historical and theoretical pattern of rhetoric. 
Few, if any, would disagree that public discourse takes center stage in 
rhetoric's history and theory. As a resuit of restricting rhetoric to suasory 
activity of the public sphère, a single pattern for rhetoric has been estab- 
lished. But we know that a great deal of sélection takes place to create 
such a monological narrative (Nienkamp 1994, 9). We also know, as 
Kenneth Burke has taught us well, that sélection présupposes rejection. 
And with rejection cornes at least marginalization, if not domination. 
By recording and theorizing only public rhetoric and ignoring private 
rhetoric, the dominant history and theory of rhetoric seems to operate in a 
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suspiciously Platonic dichotomy of thought and speech, where thè knowl- 
edge we see in thè mind's eye is différent from thè knowledge we hear in 
human speech. In this dichotomy, only one form of knowledge is reli- 
able, and it is not thè knowledge that speech produces. By accounting for 
a reflexive rhetoric in Homer, we start to dislodge thè stabilized narrative 
about rhetoric as a public thing and to diversify it in thè hope that some- 
thing previously ignored and negated can be attended to and affìrmed - 
namely, thè role of rhetoric in thè private sphère, and thè unity of thought 
and speech in thè beginnings of thè Western rhetorical tradition. 
More than this, moving toward an account of reflexive rhetoric (not 
just in Homer, but in generai) allows us to see in even greater détail thè 
centrality of rhetoric to our human condition. This seems to me thè very 
heart of Johnstone's writing on rhetoric. His work reveals that rhetoric is 
not only thè art that guides our public choices; it is thè art that guides our 
private choices as well. The possibility for enriching our understanding 
of our private and public selves calls for an exploration of reflexive rheto- 
ric. Henry Johnstone has acknowledged this cali since at least 1970, and 
he continues to respond to it with unprecedented insight. His work in 
turn calls us to be students of this idea. And in Henry Johnstone, we 
could have no better teacher. 
Department of Rhetoric and Public Address 
Whitman College 
Notes 
1 . By focusing on thè Odyssey, I do not mean to suggest that thè Iliad has fewer, or 
less relevant, délibération scènes. Nor do I mean to suggest, by focusing only on Odysseus, 
that no other characters in thè Odyssey (or thè Iliad for that matter) deliberate. 
2. For a récent Snellian account of thè fragmented Homeric psychology, see Erbse 
(1990). 
3. See, e.g., 0</. 22.333; 16.73. 
4. This référence and thè others like it refer to excerpts from Johnstone's daily jour- 
nal. He wrote these excerpts in response to our conversations. 
5. For others who comment on thè relationship between délibération and persuasion, 
see Isocrates (Antidosis 256-61), Burke (1969, 38-39), and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
(1969, 4-41). Also, Burks (1970) writes on thè link between délibération and persuasion in 
thè work of Maurice Natanson and Henry Johnstone, as well as that of Richard Whately, I. 
A. Richards, and Charles Stevenson. Yoos (1987) and Arnold (1987) address Johnstone's 
treatment of thè relationship between délibération and persuasion. Finally, Nienkamp (1994) 
provides a historical survey of thè idea of internai rhetoric. 
6. 5.465-87; 10.151-55; 10.49-54; 24.235-40; 9.299-306; 9.316-18; 9.420-24; 
11.229-30. 
7. See also Johnstone (1987, 130). 
8. See Cole ( 1 99 1 ), Schiappa ( 1 99 1 ), and Christopher Lyle Johnstone ( 1 996). Though 
each has his own nuanced rejection of Homeric rhetoric, ali three seem to share thè assumption 
that thè phenomenon of rhetoric could not be known prior to thè coining of thè term rhetorikê. 
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9. Hudson's 1923 rejection of the séparation of rhetoric and oratory comes to mind: 
"In ancient as in modern times it was found impossible to divorce theory from practice. The 
rhetorician and the orator were one. . . . [Rhetoric] does not satisfy itself alone with the 
finding of means of persuasion; it also includes the persuasive arrangement and présenta- 
tion of the speaker's material. Aproduct of rhetoric, in this sense, then, is neither an analysis 
of some speech already made, with a list of figures and tropes, nor an analysis of subject 
upon which a speech is to be made, showing what means of persuasion can be employed. 
Rather it is a speech, or some piece of persuasive discourse, persuasively presented" (1965, 
22-23). 
10. We are told that Skamandrios was taught to hunt (II . 5.5 1 ). Eurypylus was taught 
to heal wounds, as was Achilles (II. 11.832). Euphorbos was taught warfare (II. 16.811). 
The bard Demodocus was taught by Apollo (Od. 8.488), and the bard Phemios taught him- 
self (Od. 22.347). Antilochos was taught horsemanship (II. 23.307), and the handmaidens 
were taught their craft in housekeeping and caring for their mistress (Od. 22.422). Homer 
tells us only once that each of thèse arts was taught. Neither does he repeat that they were 
taught not does he expand on how they were taught. Yet this does not negate the fact that 
these practices were taught in Homer; in fact, it might very well emphasize the point. 
1 1 . Naas ( 1 995, 1 33-34) notes these instances of persuasion, but denies that thè mere 
use of persuasive techniques, or the critique of them, in the case of Antenor, can be termed 
rhetoric (134-39). 
1 2. See Karp ( 1 977), who argues for an implicit rhetorical theory in Homer, and Donlan 
(5 November 1988), who argues that we should no longer prétend - against all évidence 
and common sense - that rhetoric was not fully an art at every stage in its long history, 
including the Homeric stage. 
1 3. Athene explains to Telemachus how to discern the poles of his dilemma so that he 
can deliberate properly ( 1 .267-69; 1 .287-97); Peisistratus shares with Telemachus and oth- 
ers his internai debate over to whom he should pass the cup as an invitation to speak (3.47- 
51); Nestor, in telling Telemachus the tale of the Trojan War, mentions inner debate seven 
times, making it a thème (3.132; 3.151-52; 3.152; 3.166; 3.169; 3.194; 3.126-29). 
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